OTP Fuse Controller

The One-Time Programmable (OTP) fuse controller stores persistent chiplet policy. At cold reset it senses the fuse bank into shadow registers for software access and hardware policy enforcement. Programming a fuse and updating its shadow are separate operations.

SEP OTP fuse bank shows the fuse-bank organization.

SEP fuse map: 256 32-bit words drawn eight per row with each field at its offset, coloured by storage class, and the nine spare fields compressed into one band
Figure 1. SEP OTP fuse bank

Each row of SEP OTP fuse bank is 32 bytes, eight 32-bit words, at the offset given on the left from the base of the MAP window; a field that crosses a row boundary continues at the start of the next row. The shading gives the storage class of each field’s shadow register. The lock field, the lifecycle state, the two disable vectors and the two RMA token digests are held in non-scannable storage. CLASS_KEY, CHIPLET_UID, SIP_UID and SYS_UID are non-scannable as well and read as zero downstream while SECURE_TM is 1. The nine spare fields fill the last nine rows and are drawn as one band.

eFuse controller and technology-specific interface shim shows the controller boundary and the technology-specific fuse interface.

eFuse wrapper front end, efuse_interface_controller with its register windows, command path and guard, and the interface shim in front of the fuse bank, with the SEP-only logic outlined dashed
Figure 2. eFuse controller and technology-specific interface shim

The figure reads from the bus ports on the left to the fuse bank at the bottom. Thick arrows are AXI4, AXI-Lite or APB, and thin double-headed arrows carry a fuse command and its response. The dashed line separates the OCAH controller from the interface shim, which an adopter replaces with one for its fuse technology.

Both wrappers pass the OTP JTAG port through a lifecycle filter that answers a blocked access with an error response. Inside the controller, an AXI-Lite multiplexer merges the functional and JTAG ports. Addresses from the MAP window to the end of the last register window go through the AXI-Lite to APB bridge, and all others go to the shim’s bank control registers. The APB decode answers any address in that span outside the register windows with SLVERR. The command multiplexer gives automatic sensing priority until it completes, then gives programming priority over reading, and efuse_guard filters every command before it reaches the shim.

The SMC reuses the controller in smc_efuse_wrapper with HAS_LC_STATE=0, so the logic with a dashed outline is absent there:

  • The MMR window and efuse_token_processing: the SMC address map has no MMR window, and security_disable_o and token_match_fault_o are tied low.

  • The LC_STATE handling in efuse_shadow_regs: the held INVALID output before sensing, the token-gated LC_STATE writes and the secret masking in secure test mode. The SMC has no secret-shadow ranges and ties secure_tm_i low.

  • The RMA token-bit gate in efuse_guard.

  • The width converter and the Key Manager port of sep_efuse_wrapper: the SMC functional port is a 32-bit AXI-Lite port connected to the controller directly.

The SMC has no local lifecycle controller. Its JTAG lifecycle filter decodes the lifecycle state received from SEP, and its security_disable_i input takes the SEP security-disable status, which skips fuse sensing and opens the shadow registers to software.

1. Fuse Sensing and Boot Sequencing

When SEP is released from reset (chiplet_cold_reset), the sensing FSM automatically copies each fuse field into its dedicated memory-mapped shadow register.

The logical LC_STATE output remains 4’b1111 until fuse sensing completes; only then is the LC_STATE value sensed from the fuses driven to downstream logic such as the lifecycle controller. SEP fuse fields defines whether software can read and write the shadow register of each fuse field. Shadow registers that are not software-visible drive their fuse values directly to downstream hardware. All fuse fields other than LOCKS and LC_STATE are made available to downstream logic as soon as they are ready.

After the fuses have been read into their shadow registers, a sense-completion indicator is generated. This triggers the DFT-based memory-repair machine for the SEP SRAMs. Once memory repair completes or is bypassed, the SEP CPU is enabled and fetches its first instruction from the SEP ROM.

eFuse sensing state machine and shadow-register timing shows the fuse-sensing sequence and shadow-register timing.

Sensing FSM states ST_IDLE, ST_READ, ST_WAIT and ST_FINISHED, above a timing diagram of the response strobes, the word counter and the shadow words they fill
Figure 3. eFuse sensing state machine and shadow-register timing

The upper part of eFuse sensing state machine and shadow-register timing shows the four states of the sensing FSM in efuse_shadow_regs, and the lower part shows one sensing run cycle by cycle. ST_READ issues a single READ command for all 256 shadow words. The shim then returns one fuse_command_resp.valid strobe per word, and strobes may arrive on consecutive cycles. Each strobe stores its data in the shadow word indexed by words_received_q and increments the counter; a strobe with its status bit set still advances the counter but leaves that word unwritten. The strobe that arrives while the counter is 255 stores the last word and moves the FSM to ST_FINISHED, and fuse_sense_done_o rises one cycle later. Until then, APB accesses to the MAP window return SLVERR.

2. Shadow Register and JTAG Access Control

Each assigned lock slot contains an independent write-lock and read-lock bit. A write-lock blocks fuse programming and shadow writes; a read-lock blocks software and JTAG reads of both the fuse field and its shadow. The sensing FSM can still read locked fuses to populate the shadows.

There are two exceptions: the LOCKS and LOCKS_SPARE registers have no lock slot of their own, and LC_STATE ignores its assigned lock bits. Lifecycle transition and token checks still apply to LC_STATE. The slot numbers and bit positions are defined in SEP fuse fields.

The fuse block’s internal space, including the fuse-programming configuration space, is accessible through both a JTAG interface and an AXI interface, as shown in the figure, and each interface has its own access control. In addition to the shadow-register access control defined by SEP fuse fields, the JTAG port shall be further restricted: in the PROD and RMA_SIP states it may reach only the eFuse MMR token block. That block is the three token-input arrays (RMA_SIP_TOKEN_I, RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN_I and SEC_DISABLE_TOKEN_I), the TOKEN_EOP register that triggers a match, and the three match-status registers. Every other JTAG access to the fuse block — the shadow registers, the interface control registers and the SHIM — shall complete with an error response.

3. Fuse Programming and RMA Authorization

The fuse-programming protection shall enable the fuse-programming function only after the LOCKS field has been sensed, and shall honor the write-lock value of each field. Programming LC_STATE is subject to additional restrictions: LC_STATE[2:1] indicate whether the chiplet is in an RMA state (see the LC State Machine section of the Life Cycle Controller). The SEP fuse controller implements two 256-bit registers, RMA_SIP_TOKEN_I and RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN_I.

These two registers can be populated by both SEP software and JTAG. Each input is hashed (SHA-256) and compared with the stored RMA_SIP_TOKEN_DIGEST and RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN_DIGEST, respectively. Only on a match can LC_STATE[1] and LC_STATE[2] be programmed; the token matching section of the Programmer’s Guide gives the firmware sequence. For the matching mechanism, see Token Matching Mechanism and Attack Countermeasures.

3.1. Programming Voltage

The fuse bank shall support keeping the programming-voltage rail active for an unlimited lifetime. This is achieved by using only the internal charge-pump-generated programming voltage rather than the external programming voltage.

The charge pump is calibrated early in wafer test, and its calibration values are burned into the corresponding fuse bits; this is the only time the external fuse-programming voltage is used. Consequently, software-initiated fuse programming never needs to configure the programming voltage.

4. Shadow Register Updates and Test-Mode Protection

  • Programming a fuse does not update its shadow register until the next fuse sensing occurs.

  • The shadow registers of LOCK (both the LOCKS and LOCKS_SPARE windows), LC_STATE, SIP_DIS, and SYS_DIS are non-scannable. Any register on the path from these registers to the feature control outputs or the fuse write-enable signals is likewise non-scannable.

  • When SECURE_TM is 1 (see the Test Mode section), the shadow registers of LOCK (both the LOCKS and LOCKS_SPARE windows), LC_STATE, SIP_DIS, and SYS_DIS shall be blocked from any update, from every source — software, JTAG, and TRoot. This list is normative and exhaustive: these are the fields whose perturbation could enable a feature that a DIS vector or the lifecycle state has disabled. An implementation may block further fields, but no other requirement in this specification depends on it.

To prevent test patterns from accidentally or maliciously changing or reading out the fuse values:

  • When SECURE_TM is 1, the fuse write-enable inputs to the fuse IP block are tied inactive, and the fuse-bank outputs are disconnected from downstream logic. If needed, dedicated test registers can be added to drive the downstream logic during test.

5. Fuse Fields

SEP fuse fields lists lock slots, field sizes, shadow access permissions and purposes. Slot numbers select lock bits; they are neither OTP word offsets nor register addresses. Access permissions remain subject to the lock and lifecycle rules above.

Table 1. SEP fuse fields
Field Lock slot Size (bits) SW writable SW readable Description

LOCK

—

96

set-only

true

Lock state occupies OTP words 0–2:

LOCKS (64 bits at 0x0) covers slots 0–31: write-lock at bit 2n, read-lock at bit 2n+1 for slot n.

LOCKS_SPARE (32 bits at 0x8) covers slots 32–40: write-lock at bit 2(n-32), read-lock at bit 2(n-32)+1. Bits [31:18] are unassigned slots 41–47.

Firmware reads the complete state as three consecutive 32-bit words. There are 41 assigned slots (0–40); slot 0 belongs to LC_STATE, which ignores both lock bits. LOCK has no lock-bit pair and cannot lock itself.

LC_STATE

0

32 (4-bit state, 8-bit encoding)

set-only

true

Life-cycle state of the chiplet. The shadow encodes the logical state as {~raw[3:0], raw[3:0]} in bits [7:0]; the bit numbers below refer to the logical state. LC_STATE shall never be write-locked or read-locked by the corresponding LOCKS bits. LC_STATE[3] and LC_STATE[0] are set-only. LC_STATE[2:1] shall be set-only when the corresponding *_TOKEN has a match. Setting bit 2 also requires bit 1 to be set in the pre-write state; one write cannot establish both RMA stages. Invalid lifecycle encodings are terminal. Otherwise, LC_STATE[2:1] cannot be updated.

SBOOT_DIS

1

32 (use only 1 bit)

true

true

Disables secure boot when set to 1, in any lifecycle state. It overrides lifecycle enforcement in PROD and PROD_END and the TEST_DEV / RMA_SiP debug-lock rule, but not a signed manifest’s request for verification; see Firmware Authorization in the Lifecycle Controller section.

TRANSIENT_RMA_EN

2

32 (use only 1 bit)

true

true

Enables automatic RMA shadow-state updates after token matching, without requiring a reset. It does not enable the token matcher itself. The chiplet-token path has priority and requires an already established RMA_SIP state; a chiplet match without that state blocks the transition rather than falling through to a simultaneous SiP match. When 0, token matches do not automatically update LC_STATE; explicit shadow writes remain subject to token and transition checks.

SIP_DIS

3

64

set-only

true

SiP owner’s feature-control disable vector, provisioned by the chiplet owner. A bit set to 1 disables the corresponding feature.

SYS_DIS

4

64

set-only

true

System owner’s feature-control disable vector, provisioned by the SiP owner. A bit set to 1 disables the corresponding feature.

RMA_SIP_TOKEN_DIGEST

5

256

true

true

Hash digest of the secret RMA_SIP_TOKEN, that enables entering RMA_SIP Life Cycle state

RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN_DIGEST

6

256

true

true

Hash digest of the secret RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN that enables entering RMA_CHIPLET Life Cycle state

CLASS_KEY

7

256

true

true

Can be used for firmware encryption and decryption.

CHIPLET_PUBK_REVOKE

8

32

set-only

true

Global public-key revocation vector covering every boot-verification key of every owner (classical and PQC). SEP ROM embeds a set of public-key hash digests and accesses additional fused key hashes; each key entry maps to one bit here. Once set, SEP ROM rejects the corresponding key. Bit map: [7:0] ROM chiplet-creator classical keys (bits 0,1 are development keys); [15:8] ROM chiplet-creator PQC keys; [16]/[17] CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH0/1; [18]/[19] CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH0/1; [20]/[21] SIP_PUBK_HASH0 / SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH0; [22]/[23] SYS_PUBK_HASH / SYS_PUBK_PQC_HASH; [24]/[25] SIP_PUBK_HASH1 / SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH1; [31:26] reserved. Before the chiplet owner transfers a part to the customer, the development-key bits shall be set (revoked). (Name retained for compatibility; scope is now all owners.)

BL1_VERSION

9

256

set-only

true

BL1 anti-rollback storage. The production ROM supplies the low 128 raw bits as security-version flags to the manifest validator; the upper 128 bits do not participate in that check. See Anti-Rollback Security-Version Flags.

BL2_VERSION

10

256

set-only

true

BL2 anti-rollback storage for later-stage firmware policy. This bank is not the production ROM’s BL1 security-version input; software using it must define its encoding and enforcement policy.

CHIPLET_UID

11

256

true

true

Silicon creator’s secret device unique ID (also referred to as the UDS, Unique Device Secret). The chiplet creator is responsible for CHIPLET_UID provisioning and public identity enrollment. Write-lock and read-lock independently control modification and software visibility. Hardware recording of provisioning measurements is a proposed enhancement.

SIP_PUBK_HASH0

12

256

true

true

Hash digest of SiP owner’s root public key for secure boot (slot 0). Note: The chiplet creator’s actual root public key is embedded in the SEPROM. The digest is used to validate that public key.

SIP_UID

13

256

true

true

SiP owner’s secret device unique ID. The SiP owner is responsible for SIP_UID provisioning and public identity enrollment. Write-lock and read-lock independently control modification and software visibility. Hardware recording of provisioning measurements and retention of prior-owner key/UID pairs in the derivation hierarchy are proposed enhancements.

SYS_PUBK_HASH

14

256

true

true

Hash digest of system owner’s root public key for secure boot.

SYS_UID

15

256

true

true

System owner’s secret device unique ID. The system owner is responsible for SYS_UID provisioning and public identity enrollment. Write-lock and read-lock independently control modification and software visibility.

STATUS_RPT

16

32 (2 used)

true

true

When STATUS_RPT[1:0] == 2’b00, the boot ROM samples an SMC GPIO (STATUS_RPT) to determine whether to report status. When STATUS_RPT[1:0] == 2’b01, the boot ROM reports status; otherwise, it does not.

ROM_CTL

17

32

true

true

ROM_CTL[0]: 0 = little-endian, 1 = big-endian. ROM_CTL[5:1]: row-swap control; swaps ROM slices when set. ROM_CTL[31:6]: reserved.

SYSCLK_FREQ_MHZ

18

32 (11 used)

true

true

Configured sysclk PLL frequency in MHz (sysclk_freq_mhz[10:0]). Ignored when 0. Consumed by boot ROM clock math (PLL selection and SPI CLKDIV derivation).

CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH0

19

256

true

true

Hash of chiplet-owner authentication key 0, fused. These fused chiplet-owner key hashes can be used in addition to the hashes embedded in the ROM to authenticate manifests.

CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH1

20

256

true

true

Hash of chiplet-owner authentication key 1, fused.

REQUIRED_SIGNERS

21

32 (use only 2 bits)

true

true

Owners whose signature a manifest must carry to be authenticated by SEP ROM. Per owner, 1 = required, 0 = not-required; the default all-zero value requires no additional owner. [0] SiP owner, [1] system owner, [31:2] reserved. The chiplet creator is the root of trust — its classical and PQC root digests are embedded in SEP ROM and always authenticate BL1 — so it has no bit here. Burning a fuse bit only ever adds a required signer, so the fuse is monotonic: the standard LOCK bits exist but locking this field is unnecessary, since a later burn can never weaken security. The value is applied via the shadow register (loaded from the fuse at cold reset, SW-writable): firmware may update the shadow to set the required signers for each manifest it verifies (BL1, BL2, runtime, …​). See Secure-Boot Signing Model in the Life Cycle Controller section.

REQUIRED_ALGS

22

32 (use only 12 bits)

set-only

true

Per-owner required signature algorithms, applied only when that owner is required. Each owner has a 4-bit nibble; bit 0 = classical (ECDSA P-384 or RSA), bit 1 = post-quantum (ML-DSA), bits 3:2 reserved. The specific classical scheme and ML-DSA parameter set (e.g., ML-DSA-44/65/87) are set by the owner’s provisioned keys, not mandated here. [3:0] chiplet, [7:4] SiP owner, [11:8] system owner, [31:12] reserved. For each required (owner, algorithm) the manifest must carry a signature verified against that owner’s burned, non-revoked key of that type; all required pairs must verify, and any signature from a non-required owner is ignored.

CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH0

23

256

true

true

Chiplet owner ML-DSA PQC authentication key 0 hash, fused. PQC counterpart of CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH0.

CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH1

24

256

true

true

Chiplet owner ML-DSA PQC authentication key 1 hash, fused. PQC counterpart of CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH1.

SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH0

25

256

true

true

Hash digest of the SiP owner’s ML-DSA PQC root public key for secure boot (slot 0). PQC counterpart of SIP_PUBK_HASH0.

SYS_PUBK_PQC_HASH

26

256

true

true

Hash digest of the system owner’s ML-DSA PQC root public key for secure boot. PQC counterpart of SYS_PUBK_HASH.

SIP_PUBK_HASH1

27

256

true

true

Hash digest of the SiP owner’s root public key for secure boot, slot 1. Second slot so the SiP owner retains a usable root key after revoking slot 0 via CHIPLET_PUBK_REVOKE[24].

SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH1

28

256

true

true

Hash digest of the SiP owner’s ML-DSA PQC root public key for secure boot, slot 1. PQC counterpart of SIP_PUBK_HASH1; revocable via CHIPLET_PUBK_REVOKE[25].

SEP_CHIPLET_ID

29

256

true

true

Per-owner chiplet public identity fuse used as a public identity input to the Key Manager. No read protection is required.

SEP_SIP_ID

30

256

true

true

SiP-owner public identity fuse used as a public identity input to the Key Manager. No read protection is required.

SEP_SYS_ID

31

256

true

true

System-owner public identity fuse used as a public identity input to the Key Manager. No read protection is required.

spare0

32

256

true

true

Spare field 0 for future use.

spare1

33

256

true

true

Spare field 1 for future use.

spare2

34

256

true

true

Spare field 2 for future use.

spare3

35

256

true

true

Spare field 3 for future use.

spare4

36

256

true

true

Spare field 4 for future use.

spare5

37

256

true

true

Spare field 5 for future use.

spare6

38

256

true

true

Spare field 6 for future use.

spare7

39

256

true

true

Spare field 7 for future use.

spare8

40

256

true

true

Spare field 8 for future use.

The fuse map is exactly 8192 bits with exclusive end address 0x400 (1024 bytes, 256 × 32-bit words).

The JTAG_ID field has been removed from the fuse map and will be implemented as a top-level port.

6. Anti-Rollback Security-Version Flags

BL1_VERSION holds the device security-version flags for BL1. They are independent flags rather than a counter, and the production ROM uses bits [127:0]. BL2_VERSION is separate storage whose interpretation belongs to later-stage firmware. Both fields are set-only, so a burned flag stays set.

The Anti-Rollback requirements of the SEP Boot ROM appendix in the Programmer’s Guide define the check a manifest must pass and how firmware commits new flags.

7. RTL Integration

sep_crypto instantiates sep_efuse_wrapper. The wrapper converts the 64-bit SEP AXI interface to 32-bit AXI4-Lite through axi_dw_converter and axi_to_axi_lite, then connects to the shared efuse_interface_controller. A separate JTAG AXI4-Lite port provides manufacturing and lifecycle-restricted access.

The controller uses HAS_LC_STATE=1. Its four-bit logical lifecycle state starts at bit 96 in the shadow map and uses an eight-bit differential encoding. sep_lifecycle_ctrl decodes that state with prim_diff_decode_multi, derives feature controls from SIP_DIS and SYS_DIS, and differentially encodes its two demotion outputs. The pre-sense invalid-state behavior is described under Fuse Sensing and Boot Sequencing above.

sep_crypto assembles the Key Manager’s km_otp_data_t input from:

  • The encoded lifecycle shadow and the lifecycle controller’s two demotion outputs; demotion is not read directly from fuses.

  • The secret shadows chiplet_uid, sip_uid, sys_uid and class_key.

  • The public identity shadows sep_chiplet_id, sep_sip_id and sep_sys_id.

BL1_VERSION, BL2_VERSION, RMA token digests and public-key hashes are not part of that Key Manager interface. SEP firmware accesses them through the shadow interface; the token matcher also consumes the RMA digests internally.

For simulation, adopters need to provide an external eFuse macro model behind the shim interface. Only the generic controller and the shim interfaces are defined here.

For the canonical eFuse IP documentation covering the efuse_interface_controller internals, sensing FSM, and programming protocol, see hw/ip/efuse/doc/index.adoc (included in the SMC documentation via hw/sys/smc/doc/periphs.adoc).

8. Memory Map and Register Reference

8.1. Memory Map

Register offsets are relative to the block base in the subsystem memory map. The detailed map below defines each register and its fields.

8.2. Detailed Register Map

SEP eFuse Map Address Map

Per-field write-lock and read-lock registers for the SEP eFuse map.

Register List:

AddressNameAccessDescription
0x0LOCKSRW-
0x8LOCKS_SPARERW-
0xCLC_STATER-
0x10SBOOT_DISR-
0x14TRANSIENT_RMA_ENR-
0x18SIP_DISRWAn owner's feature control vector. When set (1'b1), the corresponding feature is disabled. Layout: see the Disable Vector Format section of lifecycle_controller.adoc.
0x20SYS_DISRWAn owner's feature control vector. When set (1'b1), the corresponding feature is disabled. Layout: see the Disable Vector Format section of lifecycle_controller.adoc.
0x28RMA_SIP_TOKEN_DIGESTR-
0x48RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN_DIGESTR-
0x68CLASS_KEYR-
0x88CHIPLET_PUBK_REVOKER-
0x8CBL1_VERSIONR-
0xACBL2_VERSIONR-
0xCCCHIPLET_UIDR-
0xECSIP_PUBK_HASH0R-
0x10CSIP_UIDR-
0x12CSYS_PUBK_HASHR-
0x14CSYS_UIDR-
0x16CSTATUS_RPTR-
0x170ROM_CTLR-
0x174SYSCLK_FREQ_MHZR-
0x178CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH0R-
0x198CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH1R-
0x1B8REQUIRED_SIGNERSRW-
0x1BCREQUIRED_ALGSRW-
0x1C0CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH0R-
0x1E0CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH1R-
0x200SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH0R-
0x220SYS_PUBK_PQC_HASHR-
0x240SIP_PUBK_HASH1R-
0x260SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH1R-
0x280SEP_CHIPLET_IDR-
0x2A0SEP_SIP_IDR-
0x2C0SEP_SYS_IDR-
0x2E0spare0R-
0x300spare1R-
0x320spare2R-
0x340spare3R-
0x360spare4R-
0x380spare5R-
0x3A0spare6R-
0x3C0spare7R-
0x3E0spare8R-

Register Details:

LOCKS

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
63SEP_SYS_ID_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sep_sys_id_read_lock (slot 31): when set, SEP_SYS_ID is not read-able.
62SEP_SYS_ID_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sep_sys_id_write_lock (slot 31): when set, SEP_SYS_ID is not write-able.
61SEP_SIP_ID_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sep_sip_id_read_lock (slot 30): when set, SEP_SIP_ID is not read-able.
60SEP_SIP_ID_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sep_sip_id_write_lock (slot 30): when set, SEP_SIP_ID is not write-able.
59SEP_CHIPLET_ID_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sep_chiplet_id_read_lock (slot 29): when set, SEP_CHIPLET_ID is not read-able.
58SEP_CHIPLET_ID_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sep_chiplet_id_write_lock (slot 29): when set, SEP_CHIPLET_ID is not write-able.
57SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH1_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_pubk_pqc_hash1_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
56SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH1_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_pubk_pqc_hash1_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
55SIP_PUBK_HASH1_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_pubk_hash1_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
54SIP_PUBK_HASH1_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_pubk_hash1_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
53SYS_PUBK_PQC_HASH_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sys_pubk_pqc_hash_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
52SYS_PUBK_PQC_HASH_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sys_pubk_pqc_hash_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
51SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH0_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_pubk_pqc_hash0_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
50SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH0_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_pubk_pqc_hash0_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
49CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH1_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_pqc_hash1_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
48CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH1_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_pqc_hash1_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
47CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH0_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_pqc_hash0_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
46CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH0_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_pqc_hash0_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
45REQUIRED_ALGS_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0required_algs_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
44REQUIRED_ALGS_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0required_algs_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
43REQUIRED_SIGNERS_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0required_signers_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
42REQUIRED_SIGNERS_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0required_signers_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
41CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH1_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_hash1_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
40CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH1_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_hash1_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
39CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH0_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_hash0_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
38CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH0_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_hash0_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
37SYSCLK_FREQ_MHZ_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sysclk_freq_mhz_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
36SYSCLK_FREQ_MHZ_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sysclk_freq_mhz_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
35ROM_CTL_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0rom_ctl_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
34ROM_CTL_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0rom_ctl_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
33STATUS_RPT_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0status_rpt_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
32STATUS_RPT_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0status_rpt_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
31SYS_UID_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sys_uid_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
30SYS_UID_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sys_uid_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
29SYS_PUBK_HASH_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sys_pubk_hash_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
28SYS_PUBK_HASH_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sys_pubk_hash_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
27SIP_UID_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_uid_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
26SIP_UID_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_uid_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
25SIP_PUBK_HASH0_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_pubk_hash0_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
24SIP_PUBK_HASH0_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_pubk_hash0_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
23CHIPLET_UID_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_uid_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
22CHIPLET_UID_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_uid_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
21BL2_VERSION_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0bl2_version_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
20BL2_VERSION_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0bl2_version_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
19BL1_VERSION_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0bl1_version_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
18BL1_VERSION_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0bl1_version_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
17CHIPLET_PUBK_REVOKE_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_revoke_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
16CHIPLET_PUBK_REVOKE_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0chiplet_pubk_revoke_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
15CLASS_KEY_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0class_key_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
14CLASS_KEY_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0class_key_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
13RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN_DIGEST_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0rma_chiplet_token_digest_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
12RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN_DIGEST_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0rma_chiplet_token_digest_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
11RMA_SIP_TOKEN_DIGEST_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0rma_sip_token_digest_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
10RMA_SIP_TOKEN_DIGEST_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0rma_sip_token_digest_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
9SYS_DIS_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sys_dis_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
8SYS_DIS_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sys_dis_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
7SIP_DIS_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_dis_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
6SIP_DIS_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sip_dis_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
5TRANSIENT_RMA_EN_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0TRANSIENT_RMA_EN_READ_LOCK, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
4TRANSIENT_RMA_EN_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0TRANSIENT_RMA_EN_WRITE_LOCK, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
3SBOOT_DIS_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0sboot_dis_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
2SBOOT_DIS_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0sboot_dis_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
1LC_STATE_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0lc_state_read_lock, when set, this field is not read-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)
0LC_STATE_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0lc_state_write_lock, when set, this field is not write-able (neither the eFuse nor the shadow register)

LOCKS_SPARE

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:18SPARE_LOCK_RSVDRW1S0x0Unassigned lock slots 41-47. Reserved for future field lock assignments.
17SPARE8_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare8_read_lock (slot 40): when set, spare8 is not read-able.
16SPARE8_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare8_write_lock (slot 40): when set, spare8 is not write-able.
15SPARE7_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare7_read_lock (slot 39): when set, spare7 is not read-able.
14SPARE7_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare7_write_lock (slot 39): when set, spare7 is not write-able.
13SPARE6_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare6_read_lock (slot 38): when set, spare6 is not read-able.
12SPARE6_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare6_write_lock (slot 38): when set, spare6 is not write-able.
11SPARE5_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare5_read_lock (slot 37): when set, spare5 is not read-able.
10SPARE5_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare5_write_lock (slot 37): when set, spare5 is not write-able.
9SPARE4_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare4_read_lock (slot 36): when set, spare4 is not read-able.
8SPARE4_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare4_write_lock (slot 36): when set, spare4 is not write-able.
7SPARE3_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare3_read_lock (slot 35): when set, spare3 is not read-able.
6SPARE3_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare3_write_lock (slot 35): when set, spare3 is not write-able.
5SPARE2_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare2_read_lock (slot 34): when set, spare2 is not read-able.
4SPARE2_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare2_write_lock (slot 34): when set, spare2 is not write-able.
3SPARE1_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare1_read_lock (slot 33): when set, spare1 is not read-able.
2SPARE1_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare1_write_lock (slot 33): when set, spare1 is not write-able.
1SPARE0_READ_LOCKRW1S0x0spare0_read_lock (slot 32): when set, spare0 is not read-able.
0SPARE0_WRITE_LOCKRW1S0x0spare0_write_lock (slot 32): when set, spare0 is not write-able.

LC_STATE

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:8rsvdR0x0Unused
7:0lc_stateR0xF0Life cycle manufacturing state, differentially encoded: {~raw[3:0], raw[3:0]}

SBOOT_DIS

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:1rsvdR0x0Unused
0disable_secure_bootR0x0Chicken bit to disable secure boot in SEP ROM.

TRANSIENT_RMA_EN

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:1rsvdR0x0Unused
0transient_rma_enR0x0When Transient RMA EN is 1, matching on corresponding *_Tokens will automatically transfer the chip to the corresponding RMA state by setting the LC_STATE reg

SIP_DIS

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
63:48func_reservedRW1S0x0Reserved for adopter-defined functional feature gating (bits 63:48).
47:25debug_reserved_dbg2RW1S0x0Reserved for adopter-defined inter-chiplet-bypass (DBG_2) debug scan chains (bits 47:25).
24sip_debugRW1S0x0SIP_DBG (bit 24): Coarse-grained debug enable for the SiP scope: the inter-chiplet debug-bypass gate that admits external (PTAP) debug traffic into this chiplet and forwards it onward to the next chiplet via the outbound JTAG PTAP. 1'b1: disabled. 1'b0: enabled.
23:4debug_reserved_dbg1RW1S0x0Reserved for adopter-defined local (DBG_1) debug scan chains (bits 23:4).
3smc_fuse_dbgRW1S0x0SMC_FUSE_DBG (bit 3): 1'b1: the DFT-inserted access path into the SMC OTP is disabled. 1'b0: enabled. Produced by SEP-LCC feat_ctrl_o, exported on the SEP boundary, and consumed by SMC to gate its own inserted fuse path.
2sep_fuse_dbgRW1S0x0SEP_FUSE_DBG (bit 2): 1'b1: the DFT-inserted access path into the SEP OTP is disabled. 1'b0: enabled. Also covers the OTP IP-vendor test and calibration interface, which is reachable only over that inserted path. The functional JTAG2AXIL path to the OTP is always available and is not gated by this bit.
1chiplet_dbgRW1S0x0CHIPLET_DBG (bit 1): Coarse-grained debug enable for the chiplet scope. 1'b1: chiplet-scope debug/scan-dump access disabled. 1'b0: enabled. Never acts alone: an external debugger reaches chiplet-internal resources only when SIP_DBG is open as well. Contributes to the reachability of the crypto/KM secure chain but never authorizes a dump from it.
0sep_debugRW1S0x0SEP_DBG (bit 0): Coarse-grained debug enable for the SEP scope. 1'b1: SEP-scope debug/scan-dump access disabled and external inbound traffic is filtered. 1'b0: enabled. A local gate only: reaching SEP internal state from an external debugger additionally requires SIP_DBG and CHIPLET_DBG.

SYS_DIS

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
63:48func_reservedRW1S0x0Reserved for adopter-defined functional feature gating (bits 63:48).
47:25debug_reserved_dbg2RW1S0x0Reserved for adopter-defined inter-chiplet-bypass (DBG_2) debug scan chains (bits 47:25).
24sip_debugRW1S0x0SIP_DBG (bit 24): Coarse-grained debug enable for the SiP scope: the inter-chiplet debug-bypass gate that admits external (PTAP) debug traffic into this chiplet and forwards it onward to the next chiplet via the outbound JTAG PTAP. 1'b1: disabled. 1'b0: enabled.
23:4debug_reserved_dbg1RW1S0x0Reserved for adopter-defined local (DBG_1) debug scan chains (bits 23:4).
3smc_fuse_dbgRW1S0x0SMC_FUSE_DBG (bit 3): 1'b1: the DFT-inserted access path into the SMC OTP is disabled. 1'b0: enabled. Produced by SEP-LCC feat_ctrl_o, exported on the SEP boundary, and consumed by SMC to gate its own inserted fuse path.
2sep_fuse_dbgRW1S0x0SEP_FUSE_DBG (bit 2): 1'b1: the DFT-inserted access path into the SEP OTP is disabled. 1'b0: enabled. Also covers the OTP IP-vendor test and calibration interface, which is reachable only over that inserted path. The functional JTAG2AXIL path to the OTP is always available and is not gated by this bit.
1chiplet_dbgRW1S0x0CHIPLET_DBG (bit 1): Coarse-grained debug enable for the chiplet scope. 1'b1: chiplet-scope debug/scan-dump access disabled. 1'b0: enabled. Never acts alone: an external debugger reaches chiplet-internal resources only when SIP_DBG is open as well. Contributes to the reachability of the crypto/KM secure chain but never authorizes a dump from it.
0sep_debugRW1S0x0SEP_DBG (bit 0): Coarse-grained debug enable for the SEP scope. 1'b1: SEP-scope debug/scan-dump access disabled and external inbound traffic is filtered. 1'b0: enabled. A local gate only: reaching SEP internal state from an external debugger additionally requires SIP_DBG and CHIPLET_DBG.

RMA_SIP_TOKEN_DIGEST

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0token_digestR0x0Hash digest of life cycle secret that allows entering RMA_SIP state / Note this is a 256 bit field

RMA_CHIPLET_TOKEN_DIGEST

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0token_digestR0x0Hash digest of life cycle secret that allows entering RMA_CHIPLET state/ Note this is a 256 bit field

CLASS_KEY

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0keyR0x0Class key that could be used for FW encryption/decryption

CHIPLET_PUBK_REVOKE

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:0selectR0x0Global public-key revocation vector covering every boot-verification key of every owner (classical and PQC). SEP ROM embeds a set of public-key hash digests and accesses additional fused key hashes; each key entry maps to one bit here. Once set, SEP ROM rejects the corresponding key. Bit map: [7:0] ROM chiplet-creator classical keys (bits 0,1 are development keys); [15:8] ROM chiplet-creator PQC keys; [16]/[17] CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH0/1; [18]/[19] CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH0/1; [20]/[21] SIP_PUBK_HASH0 / SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH0; [22]/[23] SYS_PUBK_HASH / SYS_PUBK_PQC_HASH; [24]/[25] SIP_PUBK_HASH1 / SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH1; [31:26] reserved. Before the chiplet owner transfers a part to the customer, the development-key bits shall be set (revoked).

BL1_VERSION

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0versionR0x0Minimum BL1 version that can be loaded by SEPROM

BL2_VERSION

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0versionR0x0Minimum BL2 version that can be loaded by BL1. If more boot stages exist, rollback protection can be implemented by BL2.

CHIPLET_UID

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0uidR0x0Silicon creator's secret device unique ID (also referred to as UDS - Unique Device Secret). The chiplet creator is responsible for CHIPLET_UID provisioning and public identity enrollment. When read-locked, both writability and software visibility are disabled.

SIP_PUBK_HASH0

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Hash digest of SiP owner's root public key for secure boot. The chiplet creator's actual root public key is embedded in the SEPROM; this digest is used to validate that public key.

SIP_UID

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0uidR0x0SiP owner's secret device unique ID. The SiP owner is responsible for SIP_UID provisioning and public identity enrollment. When read-locked, both writability and software visibility are disabled.

SYS_PUBK_HASH

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Hash digest of system owner's root public key for secure boot.

SYS_UID

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0uidR0x0System owner's secret device unique ID. The system owner is responsible for SYS_UID provisioning and public identity enrollment. When read-locked, both writability and software visibility are disabled.

STATUS_RPT

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:2reservedR0x0reserved
1:0rptR0x0BOOTROM report status based on the bit. 2'b00-> bootrom report status based on GPIO; 2'b01->bootrom report status;otherwise, bootrom does not report status

ROM_CTL

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:6reservedR0x0reserved
5:1rom_swap_ctrlR0x0controls how the rom slices are swapped
0rom_endianness_ctrlR0x0controls the endianness of the rom data out. 0->little endian; 1->big endian

SYSCLK_FREQ_MHZ

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:11rsvdR0x0Reserved
10:0sysclk_freq_mhzR0x0Configured sysclk PLL frequency in MHz; ignored if 0. Consumed by boot ROM clock math.

CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH0

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Chiplet owner authentication key hash digest, fused. These chiplet owner fused key hashes can be used in addition to the hashes in the ROM itself to authenticate manifests.

CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH1

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Chiplet owner authentication key hash digest, fused. These chiplet owner fused key hashes can be used in addition to the hashes in the ROM itself to authenticate manifests.

REQUIRED_SIGNERS

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:2reservedR0x0Reserved
1:0required_signersRW1S0x0Owners whose signature is required to authenticate any image loadable by SEP ROM. Per owner, 1 = required, 0 = not-required; the default all-zero value requires no additional owner. [0] SiP owner, [1] system owner. The chiplet creator is the root of trust and always authenticates BL1, so it has no bit here.

REQUIRED_ALGS

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
31:12reservedR0x0Reserved
11:8sys_algsRW1S0x0Per-owner required signature algorithms for system owner. bit 0 = classical, bit 1 = post-quantum (ML-DSA), bits 3:2 reserved.
7:4sip_algsRW1S0x0Per-owner required signature algorithms for SiP owner. bit 0 = classical, bit 1 = post-quantum (ML-DSA), bits 3:2 reserved.
3:0chiplet_algsRW1S0x0Per-owner required signature algorithms for chiplet. Each nibble: bit 0 = classical (ECDSA P-384 or RSA), bit 1 = post-quantum (ML-DSA), bits 3:2 reserved.

CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH0

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Chiplet owner ML-DSA PQC authentication key hash digest, fused. PQC counterpart of the corresponding CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH.

CHIPLET_PUBK_PQC_HASH1

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Chiplet owner ML-DSA PQC authentication key hash digest, fused. PQC counterpart of the corresponding CHIPLET_PUBK_HASH.

SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH0

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Hash digest of the SiP owner's ML-DSA PQC root public key for secure boot. PQC counterpart of SIP_PUBK_HASH.

SYS_PUBK_PQC_HASH

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Hash digest of the system owner's ML-DSA PQC root public key for secure boot. PQC counterpart of SYS_PUBK_HASH.

SIP_PUBK_HASH1

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Hash digest of SiP owner's root public key for secure boot. The chiplet creator's actual root public key is embedded in the SEPROM; this digest is used to validate that public key.

SIP_PUBK_PQC_HASH1

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0key_hashR0x0Hash digest of the SiP owner's ML-DSA PQC root public key for secure boot. PQC counterpart of SIP_PUBK_HASH.

SEP_CHIPLET_ID

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0idR0x0Per-owner public identity fuse. Personalization input for the Key Manager identity root. Being public, no read protection is required. Individually lockable via LOCKS[58:63] (slots 29-31).

SEP_SIP_ID

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0idR0x0Per-owner public identity fuse. Personalization input for the Key Manager identity root. Being public, no read protection is required. Individually lockable via LOCKS[58:63] (slots 29-31).

SEP_SYS_ID

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0idR0x0Per-owner public identity fuse. Personalization input for the Key Manager identity root. Being public, no read protection is required. Individually lockable via LOCKS[58:63] (slots 29-31).

spare0

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).

spare1

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).

spare2

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).

spare3

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).

spare4

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).

spare5

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).

spare6

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).

spare7

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).

spare8

BitsFieldAccessResetDescription
255:0rsvdR0x0Spare region for future use. Individually lockable via LOCKS_SPARE (slots 32-40).